In News:

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) is a controversial law that grants extraordinary powers to the armed forces in designated "disturbed areas." Recently, the Ministry of Home Affairs extended AFSPA for six months in parts of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh, highlighting ongoing security concerns in these regions.

Current Status of AFSPA

Extended Areas

• Nagaland: AFSPA has been extended to eight districts—Dimapur, Niuland, Chumoukedima, Mon, Kiphire, Noklak, Phek, and Peren—along with 21 police stations in additional districts.
• Arunachal Pradesh: The Act continues in Tirap, Changlang, and Longding districts, as well as in certain areas of Namsai district.

Duration of Extension

The current extension is effective from October 1, 2024, lasting for six months unless revoked earlier. These areas were initially declared "disturbed" on April 1, 2024.

About AFSPA

Objective

AFSPA aims to maintain law and order in regions affected by insurgency or unrest, providing armed forces with necessary powers to perform their duties.

Key Provisions

• Section 3: Empowers the Governor or the Central Government to declare areas as "disturbed."
• Section 4: Grants special powers for arrests and searches without warrants.
• Section 6: Mandates that arrested individuals and seized property be handed over to the police.
• Section 7: Prosecution of armed forces personnel requires prior approval from the Central Government.

Rationale for Implementation

• To enable effective counter-insurgency operations.
• To ensure the protection of armed forces members.
• To uphold national security and sovereignty.

Criticisms and Issues

AFSPA has faced significant backlash for:

• Violating Fundamental Rights: Critics argue it undermines Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
• International Law Conflicts: It is perceived as contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
• Erosion of State Autonomy: The Act is viewed as an infringement on state powers, even in peaceful contexts.

Ineffectiveness and Atrocities

Reports of human rights abuses and the ineffectiveness of AFSPA in genuinely countering insurgency raise questions about its continued application.

Government's Position

Union Home Minister Amit Shah has noted that AFSPA has been lifted from 70% of the northeastern states, but it remains in force in certain areas, including Jammu and Kashmir, where revocation is also being considered.

Jeevan Reddy Committee

On November 19, 2004, the Central Government established a five-member committee led by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy to assess the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in northeastern states. The committee was tasked with reviewing the law's implications and effectiveness.

Key Findings

In its 2005 report, the Jeevan Reddy Committee made several critical observations and recommendations:

• Complete Repeal: The committee advocated for the complete repeal of AFSPA, labeling it a "symbol of hate and oppression" and describing it as an "instrument of high-handedness."
• Incorporation into Other Legislation: It suggested that relevant provisions of AFSPA be integrated into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, with necessary modifications to delineate the powers of armed and paramilitary forces.
• Establishment of Grievance Cells: The committee recommended the creation of grievance cells in each district where armed forces are deployed, aimed at addressing public complaints and concerns regarding military actions.

Additional Recommendations

• The 5th report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission also echoed the call for repealing AFSPA, reinforcing the need for legislative reform in addressing security issues.
• In 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that the armed forces cannot evade investigation for alleged excesses committed during their duties, even in "disturbed areas." This ruling clarified that the legal protections offered by AFSPA are not absolute, emphasizing accountability.

Conclusion

AFSPA remains a contentious issue with significant implications for civil rights, regional stability, and national security. A careful review and possible reform of the Act are essential to balance security needs with the protection of fundamental rights.

In News:

Recent Developments

Insurgency-Free Declaration

Tripura Chief Minister Manik Saha has officially declared the state "insurgency-free" following a significant surrender ceremony where 584 militants from the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All-Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) laid down their arms.

Memorandum of Settlement

This milestone follows a Memorandum of Settlement signed on September 4 between the central government and various insurgent groups, witnessed by the union home minister. The Tripura government has successfully facilitated 12 peace accords over the last decade, leading to over 10,000 insurgents surrendering.

Understanding Insurgency in Tripura

Historical Context

Tribal Composition

Tripura is home to 19 indigenous tribes, including the Tripra, Reang, and Jamatia, with Kok Borok as the primary language alongside other Tibeto-Burmese dialects.

Journey to Statehood

• Accession: Tripura became part of the Indian Union on October 15, 1949.
• Union Territory: It was designated as a Union Territory on November 1, 1956.
• Statehood: Tripura attained full statehood on January 21, 1972.

Causes of Insurgency

• Demographic Changes: A significant influx of Bengali refugees from East Pakistan resulted in the indigenous population declining from 95% in 1931 to 31% by 1991.
• Tribal Discontent: The tribal population lost control over land and resources, leading to widespread grievances.
• Socio-Economic Factors: Issues such as geographic isolation, socio-economic challenges, corruption, and tribal land alienation fueled unrest.

Evolution of Political Movements and Insurgency

Formation of Political Organizations

• TUJS: Established in 1967 to advocate for tribal rights and autonomy.
• Armed Struggle: The Tripura Sena emerged in 1970, followed by the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) in 1978, both pushing for an independent tribal state.

Rise of Insurgent Groups

Key groups involved include:

• TUJS: Formed in 1971.
• TNV: Established in 1981.
• NLFT: Founded in 1989.
• ATTF: Formed in 1990.

Communal Clashes and Military Response

• Opposition from Bengali Population: Groups like Amra Bangali emerged in opposition to tribal demands, leading to violent clashes with over 1,800 fatalities.
• Military Intervention: The Indian Army was deployed in 1980 to restore order.

Attempts at Peace and Resurgence of Militancy

TNV Settlement

The TNV signed a peace agreement with the state government in 1988, focusing on restoring tribal lands. However, issues with implementation led to the rise of new militant groups.

Resurgence of Insurgency

Between 1996 and 2004, insurgency gained traction, supported by logistics from Bangladesh and external networks, leveraging the region's challenging geography.

Strategic Response to Insurgency

• Counter-Insurgency Operations
  • The state focused on effective counter-insurgency operations involving local police and paramilitary forces, minimizing the need for military deployment.
• Psychological Operations
  • Efforts were made to shift perceptions among tribal communities, exposing the exploitative nature of insurgents.
• Confidence-Building Measures
  • Rehabilitation packages and public appeals by state leaders encouraged insurgents to reintegrate into society.
• Civic and Developmental Initiatives
  • Comprehensive development initiatives were implemented, enhancing healthcare, connectivity, and job opportunities, alongside civic action programs by security forces.
• Political and Governance Reforms
  • Strengthening local governance through autonomous councils and encouraging tribal participation aimed to foster a more inclusive development process.

Conclusion

Tripura's journey to overcome insurgency highlights the effectiveness of a multi-faceted approach, combining socio-economic development with strategic military and political initiatives. The state's experience illustrates that insurgency can be addressed through sincere leadership and a balanced focus on military and socio-economic challenges.

Why is it in the News?

At least 29 Maoists were killed and three security personnel were injured in a gunbattle recently in a forest in Kanker district of Bastar division in Chhattisgarh.

Context:

• In a significant development, at least 29 Maoists were neutralized, and three security personnel sustained injuries during a fierce gun battle in a forested area of the Kanker district in Chhattisgarh's Bastar division.
• This successful joint operation, conducted by the District Reserve Guards (DRG) and the Border Security Force (BSF), marked the highest number of Maoist casualties recorded in a single operation within the Bastar region.
• The operation involved a strategic collaboration between the DRG, a specialized anti-Naxal force, and the BSF, with a well-executed plan that allowed them to engage and ultimately overpower the Maoists.

What is Left Wing Extremism?

• Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), also referred to as left-wing terrorism or radical left-wing movements, encompasses political ideologies and groups that aim to achieve substantial societal and political transformation through revolutionary methods.
• These groups may resort to targeting government institutions, law enforcement agencies, or private property to advance their objectives.
• India's LWE movement traces its origins back to the 1967 uprising in Naxalbari, West Bengal, which set the stage for the emergence of various left-wing extremist groups.
  • According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, LWE has impacted 90 districts across 10 states, with varying degrees of influence.

Maoist Presence Across India:

Maoist influence varies in intensity across different Indian states:

• Severely Affected States: Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Bihar face significant Maoist presence and activities, with frequent attacks on security forces and civilians.
• Partially Affected States: West Bengal, Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh experience a more moderate Maoist presence, with occasional incidents and clashes.
• Slightly Affected States: Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have a lower level of Maoist activity but are still considered areas of concern.
• The Communist Party of India (Maoist) has been attempting to expand its influence in the southern states of Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu, aiming to connect the Western and Eastern Ghats.
• Additionally, incursions into Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have raised concerns about long-term strategic implications.

Factors Contributing to Left-Wing Extremism in India:

Several underlying factors contribute to the rise and persistence of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) in India:

• Inequitable Development: Many LWE-affected regions are among India's least developed areas, characterized by high poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, malnutrition, and social exclusion rates.
  • LWE groups often exploit the grievances of marginalized communities, particularly tribal populations, who have been deprived of land, forest, and mineral rights.
• Marginalization: Naxalites primarily consist of Dalits, Adivasis, and other marginalized sections of society.
  • Maoist teachings deeply influence their leadership, with land reforms and economic development being key issues.
• Governance Deficit: LWE-affected areas often suffer from inadequate governance, administration, and service delivery.
  • Weak or corrupt state institutions leave a vacuum that LWE groups can exploit.
  • These groups also use violence and intimidation to disrupt democratic processes, including elections, local governance, and development schemes.
• Ideological Appeal: LWE groups claim to represent the interests of oppressed and exploited classes, promoting a radical ideology that rejects parliamentary democracy and advocates for armed revolution.
  • Drawing inspiration from Mao Zedong and the 1967 Naxalbari uprising, these groups may also have links to other extremist and separatist movements in India and abroad.
• Globalization and Cultural Displacement: The impacts of globalization, such as cultural changes and displacement, can cause feelings of dislocation and alienation.
  • Left-wing extremist movements may offer identity and purpose to individuals marginalized by global forces.
• Support Base: The Naxalite movement draws support from the landless, sharecroppers, agricultural laborers, Harijans, and tribals.
  • As long as these groups continue to face exploitation and social injustice, the Naxalite support base will persist.

The Challenges Posed by Naxalites to India:

The Naxalite movement presents several challenges to India's stability and development:

• Vulnerability to External Threats: Naxalite activities expose India's internal vulnerabilities, potentially inviting external threats.
  • The CPI (Maoist) has close ties with Northeast insurgent groups, many of which have links to external forces hostile to India.
  • The CPI (Maoist) has also expressed solidarity with Jammu and Kashmir terrorist groups.
• Impediments to Economic Development: Focusing on India's poor and marginalized regions, Naxalite activities hinder economic development efforts crucial for improving these areas' conditions.
  • Internal stability is essential for a nation's economic progress.
• Additional Internal Security Expenses: Scarce resources are diverted towards defense and internal security to counter Naxalite threats, which could be better utilized for social development initiatives.
• Adverse Impact on Governance: Naxalite domination in certain areas disrupts governance through violent tactics, such as killings, kidnappings, intimidation, and extortion.
  • This hampers the delivery of essential services to citizens in affected regions.

Steps Taken by the Government to Counter Left-Wing Extremism:

To tackle the challenges posed by Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), the Indian government has implemented various strategies and initiatives:

• Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs): CAPF battalions and Naga Battalions (BNs) are deployed to support state police forces in LWE-affected areas, providing additional security and resources.
• Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: The SRE scheme funds the recurring expenditures related to insurance, training, and operational needs of security forces, rehabilitation of surrendered LWE cadres, and awareness campaigns against violence.
• Review and Monitoring Mechanisms: The Ministry of Home Affairs regularly monitors the LWE situation at multiple levels through various review and monitoring mechanisms.
• Strengthening Intelligence Gathering: Intelligence capabilities at the central and state levels have been bolstered through measures like intelligence sharing via the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and State Multi-Agency Centre (SMAC) on a 24/7 basis.
• Inter-state Coordination: Given the cross-border nature of Maoist operations, the government facilitates frequent meetings and interactions between officials from bordering LWE-affected districts to enhance inter-state coordination.
• Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): As IEDs are a significant threat, the Home Ministry has developed a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on explosives, IEDs, and landmines in affected areas, which has been shared with stakeholders for implementation.
• Enhanced Air Support: State governments and CAPFs have received increased air support, including UAVs and helicopters, for anti-Naxal operations and casualty evacuations.

Progress and Impact of the Measures:

• Over the past eight years, India has witnessed a substantial decrease in left-wing extremism violence and its geographical spread, thanks to the government's comprehensive measures:
• The number of left-wing extremism-related incidents dropped significantly in 2022 compared to 2013, totaling 413.
• Left-wing extremism-related deaths also experienced a substantial decline, with a 75% reduction from 397 in 2013 to 98 in 2022.
• The year 2022 saw a 33% decrease in resultant deaths and a 68% decrease in security forces' casualties compared to 2021.

Way Forward:

• Effective Implementation of PESA Act: Ensure proper and complete implementation of the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) by issuing clear policy directives to empower gram sabhas.
  • Align the Act with the historical and traditional tribal way of life and address implementation gaps that Maoists exploit.
• Tribal Empowerment and Representation: Foster tribal leadership by providing platforms for their voices to be heard and increasing representation in local governance structures and political processes.
  • Address tribal communities' aspirations and ensure policies accommodate their unique needs and perspectives.
• Targeted Development Programs: Implement development programs addressing socio-economic issues faced by tribal communities, including infrastructure, healthcare, education, and employment opportunities. Involve local communities in participatory decision-making processes for initiatives.
• Counter Maoist Propaganda: Develop communication strategies to expose the gap between Maoist rhetoric and actions.
  • Collaborate with local media, community leaders, and influencers to spread accurate information and counter misinformation.
• Negotiation and Conflict Resolution: Explore avenues for peaceful negotiation with moderate Maoist factions, identifying root causes of discontent and involving neutral mediators, civil society organizations, and respected community leaders in peacebuilding efforts.
• Human Rights Protection: Prioritize human rights protection in conflict zones, ensuring security measures align with the rule of law and minimizing collateral damage and civilian casualties.
• Long-term Strategic Planning: Develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy focused on sustainable development, social justice, and inclusive governance to address underlying issues contributing to the insurgency.

Conclusion

There is a widely acknowledged perspective that effectively addressing the Naxal issue requires a balanced approach involving both developmental and security measures. It's crucial not to solely consider it as a law and order challenge, as innocent tribal communities residing in remote forest areas often become targets of Naxal intimidation. Priority lies in re-establishing governance in Naxal-affected regions, fostering their development, and empowering marginalized communities to lead secure, dignified, and improved lives